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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
circumstance present in this case: that there were a number of tenants having
diverse businesses in the same building. Generally, cases involving evaluations
of fixtures have been concerned with situations in which the building condemned
was occupied by one type of business such as a factory or warehouse. The Court
found that the unique situation existing in this case warranted a departure from
the established methods of evaluation in eminent domain actions. Support for
this position can be found in the following statement:
Indeed, we think that it is an undue simplification to extract from the
books any "Unit Rule" whatever, in the sense of general authoritative
directions. What has happened, so far as we can see is that, as different
situations have arisen, the courts have dealt with them as the specific
facts demanded.14
In view of the above statement, combined with the obvious injustice that would
result to the claimants if the unit rule were adhered to, the Court was drawn
to the conclusion that it would be just and proper in the present cases to
evaluate the fixtures separately, and that in determining their value evidence
of the reproduction cost less depreciation was sufficient.
Though the decision in the instant case does not stray far from former
decisions regarding the evaluation of fixtures, it does create a new rule. The
results obtained in the instant case do seem just and proper, but the same result
could have been reached without developing a new rule of law. If the issues
had been viewed as involving the admission of evidence, the Court could have
resolved the case by relying upon existing decisions. The Court has previously
held that a tenant, if the owner of the fixtures, is entitled to recover their value, 15
and it has also held that, in determining the amount by which the fixtures
enhance the value of the land, evidence of their reproduction cost less de-
preciation is admissible. 16 By combining these two propositions the same result
could have been reached. Nevertheless, the present decision indicates that the
Court is not disposed toward inertness. The Court has probably reached an
adequate solution to the ever growing problem of determining condemnation
awards in situations where there are a number of distinct businesses being con-
ducted on one parcel of condemned land by various tenants.
William F. Kirk
REFERENDIM UNNECESSARY FOR AcQuIsiTION OF PROPERTY PURSUANT TO
LocAL FINANCE LAW
On July 14, 1959, the town board of Islip, passed a resolution to acquire
certain real property within the town limits for the purpose of establishing a
public parking lot and bathing beach. Concurrently, the board resolved to
finance the acquisition by the issuance of town bonds in the amount of $12,000
14. United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d 526, 528 (2d Cir. 1948).
15. Matter of City of New York (Allen St.), 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931).
16. Matter of City of New York (Alien St.), supra note 15.
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with a maturity of less than five years pursuant to the New York Local
Finance Law, and passed a bond resolution to that effect. Condemnation pro-
ceedings were initiated in the Supreme Court. That court awarded $12,500 to
the owners of the property and $5,000 as consequential damage to property
across the street. The town took an appeal from the award of consequential
damages to the Appellate Division, and the property owners cross-appealed
from the entire award. The Appellate Division, in a memorandum decision,
reversed the order of the Supreme Court and dismissed the petition on the
ground that the condemnation proceeding was jurisdictionally defective for
failure of the town board to submit the matter to referendum as required by
the New York Town Law.' The court affirmed the findings of fact below and
would have affirmed the order if it had not been otherwise objectionable. The
Court of Appeals, all justices concurring, reversed the order of the Appellate
Division. Held, a referendum was unnecessary when the acquisition was to be
made pursuant to the Local Finance Law and the expenditure financed by the
issuance of bonds of less than five years' maturity. The issue of consequential
damages was one of fact, affirmed by the Appellate Division, and not for the
Court of Appeals to review. Matter of Town Bd. of Town of Islip, 12 N.Y.2d
321, 189 N.E.2d 808, 239 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1963).
The law governing the conduct of town affairs is found mainly in the
Town Law. The Local Finance Law is controlling as to the financial dealings
of a municipality. Prior to the enactment of the Local Finance Law, town
officials were required to look to the provisions of many of the different Con-
solidated Laws.2 The intent of the legislature to make the Local Finance Law
the exclusive authority in fiscal matters is clearly set forth in the Law itself.3
Subsequent amendments to various of the Consolidated Laws which might be
construed to conflict with the Local Finance Law left no doubt that the legisla-
ture desired to bring other laws into harmony with it.4 Municipalities are further
guided by written opinions issued from the Office of the State Comptroller 5
answering specific inquiries regarding fiscal problems and interpretation of law.
This perhaps accounts for the relative paucity of litigation on questions of local
finance. One of the few areas left in doubt was the question of the necessity of
obtaining voter approval by referendum prior to making certain expenditures.
1. In the matter of Town Board of Town of Islip, 17 A.D.2d 654, 230 N.Y.S.2d 293
(2d Dep't 1962).
2. Among the Consolidated Laws affected by the Local Finance Law are: Conserva-
tion, County, Education, General City, General Municipal, Highway, Optional County,
Public Housing, Railroad, Rapid Transit, Second Class Cities, Social Welfare, Town and
Village Laws.
3. § 176.00. Local finance law to be the exclusive law:
Except as otherwise provided in this article, all statutes, local laws, ordinances,
rules and regulations, insofar as they relate to the matters herein contained, are
hereby superseded, it being the legislative intent that this chapter shall constitute
the exclusive law on such matters.
4. See, e.g., N.Y. Sess. Laws 1943, ch. 710, § 1.
S. See Opinions of the State Comptroller Relating to Municipal Government (1945-
date) (hereinafter Op. St. Compt'r).
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At the time of the town board's action (1959), section 81 of the Town
Law6 provided, among other things, that a proposal for the acquisition of lands
for public parking places and public parks or playgrounds be submitted at a
town election. It further provided that nothing in that section should be con-
strued to prevent the financing of a project pursuant to the Local Finance Law.
Section 220 of the Town Law7 similarly provided for a permissive referendum
on the same subject matter. It, too, allowed financing to be made pursuant to
the' Local Finance Law. Section 35.00, Local Finance Law, 8 called for a per-
missive referendum on a bond resolution; however, resolutions authorizing the
issuance of bonds with a maturity of less than five years were exempted from
the referendum requirement. This section further prohibited referendums on
expenditures for which it was proposed to issue obligations. No apparent con-
flict was found by the New York State Supreme Court in a case involving
construction of a public building with surplus funds. The town board refused
to submit the matter to referendum, even though it was properly petitioned
6. At the time of the town board's resolutions the pertinent portions of the cited
sections of the Town Law were as follows:
§ 81. Election upon proposition
The town board may upon its own motion and shall upon a petition . . . cause to
be submitted at a ... town election, a proposition:
1. In any town:
(d) To establish . . . public parking places, public parks or playgrounds,
acquire the necessary lands therefor ....
Any expenditure approved pursuant to this section shall be paid for by taxes
levied for the fiscal year in which such expenditure is to be made. However,
nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent the financing
in whole or in part, pursuant to the local finance law, of any expenditure
enumerated in this section which is not authorized pursuant to this section.
7. § 220. General town improvements
Upon the adoption of a resolution therefor, subject to a permissive referendum,...
the town board may:
4. Establish ... public parking places, public parks or playgrounds, acquire the
necessary lands therefor ....
5.
[The second part of this paragraph contains exactly the same language as
section 81, paragraph 5, supra note 6.1
8. As of the date of the town board's resolution, the pertinent portions of section
35.00 were as follows:
Sec. 35.00. Bond resolution subject to referendum ...
....
1. A bond resolution adopted by the finance board of a town of the first
class shall be subject to a permissive referendum. ...
The foregoing provisions of this paragraph (b) shall not apply to a bond
resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds:
(1) With a proposed maturity of not more than five years to be measured
from the date of the bonds or from the date of the first bond anticipa-
tion note issued in anticipation of the sale of such bonds, whichever
date is the earlier.
(c). The expenditure of money for which it is proposed to issue obligations shall
not be subject to a permissive or mandatory referendum in any town.
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to do so. The court held that the town board's action fell within the purview
of section 35.00, Local Finance Law, even without resorting to the fiction of
financing the expenditure with an unnecessary five-year bond issue.9 In a case
involving a town board of trustees' acquisition of real property with funds ex-
isting for such a purpose, the Appellate Division found that the board had
exceeded its jurisdiction in not complying with sections 81 and 220 of the Town
Law. Section 35.00, Local Finance Law, was considered inapplicable because,
in the court's opinion, there was no element of financing involved.10 This
decision was cited by way of comparison in the Appellate Division's opinion in
the instant case. Finally, the Supreme Court considered the case of a town's
failure to submit to referendum a proposition to acquire lands for a park where
the moneys were to come from a specific fund created for that purpose. The
court looked to both of the above cases and reluctantly followed the latter
decision, even though it favored the reasoning in the former opinion.1 The
key factor seemed to be the lack of an "element of financing." It was in this
posture that the instant case went to the Court of Appeals.
Lacking any cases directly in point, the Court looked to the language and
history of the statutes. Sections 81 and 220, Town Law, were identically amended
twice prior to the effective date of the Local Finance Law. The earlier amend-
ment provided:
Any expenditure approved pursuant to this section shall be paid for
by taxes levied for the fiscal year in which such expenditure is to be
made. However, nothing contained in this section shall be construed
to prevent the financing, in whole or in part, of any expenditure
enumerated in this section pursuant to the local finance law . 2
The later amendment changed the last sentence to read:
However, nothing contained in this section shall be construed to
prevent the financing in whole or in part, pursuant to the local finance
law, of any expenditure enumerated in this section which is not
authorized pursuant to this section.'3 (Emphasis supplied by the
Court.)
The emphasized language indicated to the Court that the legislature intended
that the listed expenditures could be authorized by a method alternative to
referendum, to wit, according to the provisions of the Local Finance Law. It
was noted that the effective date of the later amendment was September 2, 1945,
while the Local Finance Law became effective on September 1, 1945,14 thereby
further indicating that the amendment was meant to harmonize the Town Law
with the Local Finance Law. In order to determine whether, as the Appellate
9. Glezen v. Town Bd., 192 Misc. 658, 81 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (cited with
approval in the instant opinion).
10. Knapp v. Fasbender, 278 App. Div. 970, 105 N.Y.S.2d 780 (2d Dep't 1951).
11. Town of Huntington v. Lustig, 226 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
12. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1943, ch. 710, pt. 1, § 2619.
13. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 838, § 59.
14. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1942, ch. 424.
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Division reasoned, section 35.00 of the Local Finance Law only eliminated the
necessity of a referendum on the financing aspect and not on the actual acquisi-
tion, the Court examined subdivision (c) of that section: "The expenditure of
money for which it is proposed to issue obligations shall not be subject to a
permissive or mandatory referendum in any town."
The Court found that the purpose of this provision was to eliminate the
possibility of a double referendum in situations where the financing scheme re-
quired a referendum. When real property was the subject matter, the term
"expenditure" must be equated with "acquisition," thereby obviating the
requirement for any referendum when financed by five-year bonds. Finally,
the legislative intent, as expressed in section 176.00, Local Finance Law, re-
solved any doubts the Court may have had in regard to the possible conflict
of the two laws. Viewed in its narrowest sense, the holding of the instant case
resolves the question of the necessity of a referendum when an expenditure is
to be financed by a five-year bond issue. In practice, town boards, under the
guidance of State Comptroller opinions, have operated in this manner since
1946.1r However, there are indications that the ruling might apply to expendi-
tures to be financed out of current income or by funds existing for such purposes.
Since 1959, the legislature has further amended sections 81 and 220, Town Law,
to provide an exemption from referendum of expenditures financed in whole
by surplus funds.'6 State Comptroller opinions have gone so far as to look with
approval upon a plan whereby, if an expenditure for which it is proposed to
issue twenty-year bonds is defeated in a referendum, the town could go ahead
with the project, using five-year bonds, despite voter disapproval. 17
The Appellate Division's reliance in part on its earlier decision, which it
cited by way of comparison,' 8 might have been tempered by a careful reading
of a Court of Appeals opinion in a case of the same name, involving different
issues.19 The Court, referring to the Appellate Division's statement that the
town board of trustees did not have the power to acquire real property without
compliance with sections 81 and 220 of the Town Law, said ". . . the decision
in Knapp v. Fasbender, . . . was in error to the extent that it held that the
board of trustees was without the power to acquire lands for a beach or a
recreation project."2 0 This could indicate that even if a municipality would be
required to hold a referendum, its failure to do so would not render the con-
demnation proceeding void for lack of jurisdiction. The trend is to give town
boards more immediate control over expenditures. This removes from the
electorate the right to express its wishes in a direct manner; however, this
15. See 2 Op. St. Compt'r 227 (1946).
16. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 909, § 2; ci. Op. St. Compt'r 336 (1947).
17. 17 Op. St. Compt'r 155 (1961); cf. 12 Op. St. Compt'r 133 (1956).
18. Knapp v. Fasbender, 278 App. Div. 970, 105 N.Y.S.2d 780 (2d Dep't 1951).
19. Knapp v. Fasbender, 1 N.Y.2d 212, 134 NYE.2d 482, 151 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1958).
20. Id. at 226, 134 N.E.d at 489, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
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limitation is not as onerous as may appear. The town board is limited to the
issuance of relatively short-term obligations, and in the case of spending from
current funds, the amounts must of necessity be within reason.
Courtland R. LaVallee
ORDER OF PREFERENCE BETWEEN ARTISAN'S STATUTORY LIEN AND CLAIM OF
CONDITIONAL VENDOR
The plaintiff, assignee of a conditional sales contract, brought an action
for conversion, based on the alleged wrongful sale by defendant-repairman of
an automobile baled to him for necessary repairs by the conditional buyer.
It was contended by plaintiff that since the conditional buyer had defaulted in
his payments prior to the bailment, absolute title to the automobile was in
plaintiff as the conditional seller's assignee; therefore, defendant's rights under
its artisan's lien were subordinate to plaintiff's. The defendant pleaded a valid
and prior lien under section 184 of the N.Y. Lien Law. From a judgment against
the defendant-repairman and an affirmance thereof by the Appellate Division'
the defendant appealed. Held, reversed. By ordering repairs on an automobile,
a conditional buyer, in default, but in possession, could and did create a valid
and prior lien in favor of the repairman. Motor Discount Corp. v. Scappy &
Peck Auto Body, Inc., 12 N.Y.2d 227, 188 N.E.2d 907, 238 N.Y.S.2d 670
(1963).
The common law uniformly confers a lien in favor of the artisan who, by
his labor, skill or materials, adds value to the chattel of another at the direct
or implied request of the owner.2 In attempting to apply this principle to the
currently popular installment plan purchase of automobiles, disagreement has
often resulted from a question which seems inevitably to follow: does the lien
of a repairman who has made repairs at the order of the conditional buyer take
precedence over the conditional seller's claim to the property in question? The
general rule established by the common law is that a lein prior in time to another
claim is entitled to prior satisfaction out of the security unless it is intrinsically
defective or is destroyed by some act of the holder.3 This stems from the fact
that a lien is a qualified property right which can under common law principles
be created only by consent of the general owner of the property in question.4
Since the conditional seller of a chattel who reserves title in himself until the
price is paid is regarded as the owner at common law,5 it follows that his right
would prevail over a subsequent lien claimant. Despite the common law rule,
1. Motor Discount Corp. v. Scappy & Peck Auto Body, Inc., 14 A.D.2d 847 (1st Dep't
1961) (without opinion).
2. Brown, Personal Property 516 (1955); 37 Mich. L. Rev. 273 (1938).
3. A frequently cited leading case -to this effect is: Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
175 (1827). See also Restatement, Security § 76 (1941) ; Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 201 (1954).
4. Hollingsworth v. Dow, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 228 (1837); Restatement, Security 75(2)
(1941).
5. Brown, op. cit. supra note 2, at 534.
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